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1. Introduction
‘Constitutional dialogue’ has rapidly become more important in processes of public decision-making.1 
Calls for ‘dialogue’ are resorted to when conflicts that cannot be simply solved by legal logic arise. In 
addition, references to the term ‘dialogue’ in scholarly writing on constitutional law have surged in the 
last decade.2 The potential of ‘dialogue’ has been explored in various publications that are concerned with 
the legitimating, constituting or instrumental functions of public law.3 Furthermore, in legal practice the 
term ‘dialogue’ is sometimes employed as if it were a ‘term of art’.4 At the same time, due to a lack of any 
legal meaning constitutional dialogue often amounts to a convenient label suggesting ‘mutual learning 
and improvement’.5 
Yet, despite this popularity – or perhaps partly because of the easy appeal of the term – the academic 
and the practical legal community still appears to be unsure what qualifies as a ‘dialogue’ either in practice 






1	 See	for	example	T.R.S.	Allan,	‘Constitutional	Dialogue	and	the	Justification	of	Judicial	Review’,	2003	Oxford Journal of Legal Studies	23,	
pp.	563-584;	D.	Barak-Erez,	‘The	International	Law	of	Human	Rights	and	Constitutional	Law:	A	Case	Study	of	an	Expanding	Dialogue’,	2004	
International Journal of Constitutional Law	2,	pp.	611-632;	B.O.	Bryde,	‘The	Constitutional	Judge	and	the	International	Constitutionalist	
Dialogue’,	2006	Tulane Law Review	80,	pp.	203-219;	P.	Chen,	‘The	Constitutional	Politics	of	Roads	and	Canals:	Inter-Branch	Dialogue	over	
Internal	Improvements’,	2006	Whittier Law Review	28,	pp.	625-662;	V.C.	Jackson,	‘Constitutional	Dialogue	and	Human	Dignity:	States	and	
Transnational	Constitutional	Discourse’,	2004	Montana Law Review	65,	pp.	15-40;	R.J.	Krotoszynski,	 ‘Constitutional	Flares:	On	Judges,	
Legislatures	and	Dialogue’,	1998	Minnesota Law Review	83,	pp.	1-62;	K.	Roach,	‘Constitutional,	Remedial,	and	International	Dialogues	about	
Rights:	The	Canadian	Experience	Symposium:	Globalization	and	the	Judiciary’,	2005	Texas International Law Journal	40,	pp.	537-576.
2	 See C. Bateup,	‘The	Dialogic	Promise	–	Assessing	the	Normative	Potential	of	Theories	of	Constitutional	Dialogue’,	2006	Brooklyn Law 
Review	71,	p.	1109.
3	 As	for	the	legitimating	function	see	for	example	Allan,	supra	note	1;	A.	Petter,	‘Taking	Dialogue	Theory	Much	too	Seriously’,	2007	Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal	45,	no.	1,	pp.	147-168;	B.M.	Bakker,	‘Blogs	as	Constitutional	Dialogue:	Rekindling	the	Dialogic	Promise?’,	2008	New York 
University Annual Survey of American Law	63,	pp.	215-267.	As	for	the	constituting	function,	see	Barak-Erez,	supra	note	1;	Jackson,	supra	
note	1.	As	for	the	instrumental	function,	see	for	example	Chen,	supra	note	1;	P.M.	Hogg	et	al.,	‘Charter	Dialogue	Revisited	–	or	Much	Ado	
about	Metaphors	Charter	Dialogue:	Ten	Years	Later’,	2007	Osgoode Hall Law Journal	45,	pp.	1-65.
4	 E.g.,	in	a	draft	resolution	of	the	European	Parliament	(RC-B5-0405/2001,	7	June	2001,	PE	305.588)	the	term	‘transatlantic	constitutional	
dialogue’	was	used	for	an	exchange	between	the	US	Congress	and	the	European	Parliament.
5	 For	 instance,	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights	 labels	 its	 symposia	 for	 judges	 ‘Dialogues	 between	 Judges’,	 M.H.L.K.	 Claes	 &	
M.C.B.F.	de	Visser,	‘Are	You	Networked	Yet?	On	Dialogues	in	European	Judicial	Networks’,	2012	Utrecht Law Review	8,	no.	2,	p.	105.
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without further definition.6 The employment of ‘constitutional dialogue’ in academic literature varies 
from casual uses as a metaphor to proclamations along the lines of the concept having become ‘part of 
mainstream discourse regarding the separation of powers’7 and references to ‘constitutional dialogue 
theory’.8
These multiple modes of employment make it clear that the content and scope of ‘constitutional 
dialogue theory’ is not evident and needs further academic attention. As it appears that we are dealing 
with an ‘essentially contested concept’9 – much like ‘democracy’ – ongoing competition regarding its 
interpretation is part of its usefulness. ‘Dialogue’ has a variety of meanings, all of which are based on a 
shared archetypical notion. This, however, leaves room for persistent debate about the specific features 
and – most importantly – proper use of the concept. The contested nature of the concept is illustrated by 
the fact that in contemporary legal scholarship ‘constitutional dialogue’ is employed in connection with 
different theoretical approaches, which are not mutually exclusive, ranging from explanatory accounts 
to a set of normative principles on which constitutional practices can be based.10 As a reaction to the 
lack of clarity surrounding an increasingly popular concept, this paper aims to provide an overview 
of various strands of literature on constitutional dialogue as well as a practical guide to navigating this 
literature for scholars who are considering employing this concept in their research. Our central question 
is the following: what possibilities of application in legal research does the concept of constitutional dialogue 
provide, considering the existing conceptualizations and applications in legal literature?
We proceed by briefly explaining our approach to answering the presented research question 
(Section  2). Subsequently we provide a deeper insight into the concept of constitutional dialogue 
(Section 3). For this purpose, we first analyze what constitutes a constitutional dialogue and how it is 
conceptualized in academic terms (Section3.1). We then provide a brief overview of theoretical accounts 
identified within the studied literature (Section 3.2.1), whereupon these will be further discussed on 
the basis of various institutional settings in which the concept of constitutional dialogue is employed 
(Sections 3.2.2-3.2.5). Based on this review, we will address the caveats encountered in different usages 
of the concept of ‘constitutional dialogue’ (Section 4). Finally, we present an overview of the broader 
implications of our findings and consider possibilities and pitfalls with regard to the application of the 
concept within legal research (Section 5) and conclude by a summary of our findings (Section 6). In line 
with the theme of this special issue we provide some illustrations from current constitutional debates in 
the Netherlands.11
2. Research design and methodology
Precisely because we are interested in the variety of uses of the concept of ‘constitutional dialogue’ in the 
literature, we conducted a systematic literature review. This has allowed us to categorize what is already 
known about constitutional dialogue, what underlying concepts and theoretical approaches are relevant 
to constitutional dialogue and which significant controversies, inconsistencies and unanswered questions 
are present.12 The systematic search resulted in a large variety of sources. The most relevant – i.e. articles 
clearly utilizing the concept of constitutional dialogue as the main concept in the publication – among 
6	 A	helpful	 general	definition	of	 ‘dialogue’	 can	be	 found	 in	W.	Barnett	Pearce	&	K.A.	Pearce,	 ‘Taking	a	 communication	perspective	on	






2000	Indiana International & Comparative Law Review	11,	pp.	1-36.	
9	 Meeting	the	basic	conditions	of	‘appraisiveness’,	‘intern	complexity’,	‘diverse	describability’,	‘openness’	and	‘reciprocal	recognition’,	see	
W.B.	Gallie,	‘Essentially	contested	concepts’,	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society	1956-57,	pp.	167-220.	The	authors	would	like	to	thank	
Maurice	Adams	for	the	suggestion.
10	 Based	on	Bateup,	supra	note	2.
11	 The	concept	of	 ‘constitutional	dialogue’	 seems	 to	have	gained	a	 footing	 in	Dutch	 legal	academia	since	A.W.	Heringa,	Constitutionele 
partners, Rechterlijke toetsing als instrument voor samenwerking tussen rechter en wetgever,	 inaugural	 lecture	Maastricht	University,	
1996.
12	 A.	Bryman,	Social Research Methods,	2008,	p.	81.
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these have been selected based on titles, abstracts and conclusions. To avoid bias with regard to the 
selected sources, we added relevant publications using the technique of snowball sampling – considering 
the most cited publications on constitutional dialogue theory within our selected sources – and by 
consulting a group of experts regarding our initial literature review.13 
After a general reading of the results, a sample of 16 publications has been scored or analyzed for a 
number of indicators, drafted based on our research aim and question.14 First, we considered whether 
or not an explicit or implicit definition of the concept of dialogue and constitution was provided and, 
if so, what particular elements of ‘constitutional dialogue’ it consisted of. Our preliminary research had 
shown that some authors are not interested in ‘dialogue’ as such, but in explaining or highlighting certain 
aspects of constitutional practice – thus using the concept as a ‘lens’ – and others were explicitly focused 
on the qualities of ‘dialogue’ that might be of use when shaping public decision-making – thus developing 
‘dialogue’ as a method. Therefore we designed a framework of analysis for determining in which manner 
the author applied the concept.15 Through this framework, we also collected data on the institutional 
setting, or, the ‘participants’ within the dialogue: to which actors did the author refer when using the 
concept of constitutional dialogue? Finally, we considered the theoretical stance in the publication. Did 
the author explicitly refer to ‘constitutional dialogue theory’ and what – explicit or implicit – theoretical 
approach was taken? Applying this framework to the selected sources provided a rigorous overview 
of the academic employment of the concept of constitutional dialogue, which after a synthesis and 
supplementation of further relevant findings constituted the findings as discussed below.
3. Overview of the literature on constitutional dialogue
3.1. Defining constitutional dialogue
When browsing the literature on constitutional dialogue, the first problem encountered is the 
definitional bleakness surrounding the concept. The absence of a clear and generally accepted definition 
of ‘constitutional dialogue’ in the publications studied contributes to the current diversity in modes of 
employment of the concept. If we want to consider the possibilities of academically applying ‘constitutional 
dialogue’, at the very least a working definition is needed. Consulting the existing literature provides 
us with some clues for this important step. Bakker, for example, states that ‘constitutional dialogue 
encompasses the idea that different governmental branches and people interact in ways that shape the 
dominant views of constitutional interpretation over time’.16 Dor refers to the dictionary definition and 
describes dialogue as ‘an open and frank interchange, exchange and discussion of ideas and opinions 
in the seeking of mutual harmony’.17 Other authors have been far less concerned with certain detailed 
definitions but have instead described a general narrative that provides a listing of activities that dialogue 
should encompass. Alternatively, instead of defining or describing the concept, related terms such as 
‘conversation’ or ‘interaction’ are simply mentioned in the same breath.18 An overview of recurring 
13	 The	group	of	experts	has	been	consulted	during	the	workshop	on	constitutional	dialogues	held	at	Tilburg	University,	14	September	2012.
14	 For	 the	questionnaire	used,	 see	Annex	1.	The	16	publications	were:	Allan,	 supra	note	1;	Petter,	 supra	note	3;	Bakker,	 supra	note	3;	
Barak-Erez,	 supra	 note	 1;	 Bateup,	 supra	 note	 2;	 C.	 Bateup,	 ‘Expanding	 the	 Conversation:	 American	 and	 Canadian	 Experiences	 of	















18	 See,	e.g.,	B.	Friedman,	‘The	History	of	the	Countermajorian	Difficulty,	Part	One:	The	Road	to	Judicial	Supremacy’,	1998	New York University 
Law Review	73,	pp.	333-342.
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elements in the literature on constitutional dialogue that may be of use in defining the concept is provided 
below.
Publications employing the concept of constitutional dialogue tend to refer to equality between 
dialogic partners, or at least a (temporary) ignoring of power relations, often pointing to a shift from 
hierarchy to heterarchy as a basic structure within which the disciplining of public power takes place.19 
This feature is related to an increasing informality in processes that shape and control public power. 
Sometimes, as in the Canadian ‘constitutional dialogue’ (see below), this means that actors permit 
themselves more freedom in the exercise of their constitutionally defined tasks. At other times, increased 
interdependency means that actors responsible for public decision-making go beyond their traditional 
mandates in the name of ‘dialogue’. 
A further recurring feature is the requirement of a certain deliberative quality to the interaction 
in order for dialogue to be a legitimating factor in processes of public decision-making.20 Although 
participants still have agendas and interests to defend, they connect these to their relationships with their 
dialogic partners and the agendas and interests those partners may have, even when they are conflicting. 
The learning process that public actors experience when they interact with (foreign) counterparts also 
plays a role in constitutional dialogue literature.21 One specific example can be found in Jackson’s work, 
in which ‘dialogue’ is considered a transnational process leading to the incorporation of certain human 
rights norms into national constitutions.22
The ‘dialogue’ does not need to be explicitly shaped as such. Courts or other constitutional actors 
do not need to acknowledge that they are engaged in a dialogue.23 In the case of courts, for instance, 
they can implicitly invite other relevant actors to react by phrasing their judgments in a certain way. In 
the same vein, procedures that may seem very hierarchical, such as the preliminary reference procedure 
in EU law, can in practice acquire a ‘dialogical character’ if the courts involved create leeway for input. 
Claes and De Visser have drawn attention to the confusing nature of these ‘silent dialogues’ for the actors 
involved.24 Constitutional dialogues can also be ‘silent’ in the sense that a lack of reaction can be taken 
as a nod of approval.25
Furthermore, instances of dialogue may be called ‘constitutional’ because of their aspiration to 
contribute to, implement or even shape the basic norms that govern the actions of public entities and their 
exercise of coercive power in particular.26 Of course this contribution cannot be a one-off. On the other 
hand, the codification of ‘dialogical mechanisms’, such as explicitly present in some constitutions (such 
as Article 33 of the Canadian Charter), is not crucial for the qualification of an action as ‘constitutional’; 
an institutionalized practice (a ‘pattern’ in our questionnaire, see Annex 1) suffices.
Considering the aforementioned, we arrive at the following working definition of constitutional 
dialogue: a sequel of implicitly or explicitly shaped communications back and forth between two or more 
actors characterized by the absence of a dominant actor – or at least by a bracketing of dominance –, with 
the shared intention of improving the practice of interpreting, reviewing, writing or amending constitutions. 
This definition expressly leaves open the question of which actors can be involved as we found that the 
concept of constitutional dialogue has been employed in various institutional settings, with different but 
overlapping theoretical underpinnings. For our purpose – considering exactly the use of ‘constitutional 
dialogue in a comprehensive manner’ – limiting our working definition to specific types of actors 
would be self-defeating. In our view, the academic relevance of the concept is not limited to a specific 
institutional setting. To support this argument, and to provide further insight into the applicability of the 
concept of constitutional dialogue, the next section will deal with several institutional settings and their 
corresponding theoretical approaches. 
19	 See	for	example	Allan,	supra	note	1,	p.	584.	He	refers	to	a	‘balanced	bower	between	law-giver	and	interpreter’.






25	 J.	Resnik,	‘Law’s	Migration:	American	Exceptionalism,	Silent	Dialogues,	and	Federalism’s	Multiple	Ports	of	Entry’,	2006	Yale Law Review 
115,	p.	1564.
26	 N.	Walker,	‘The	Idea	of	Constitutional	Pluralism’,	2002	Modern Law Review	65,	no.	3,	pp.	317-359.
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3.2. Theorizing constitutional dialogue
The concept of constitutional dialogue is most often referred to by scholars with regard to the proper role of 
the judiciary in relation to the executive and legislative branches of government.27 The classical statement 
by Bickel that ‘judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in a legal system’28 has led scholars to engage 
in a debate to either sustain or circumvent the majoritarian difficulty, using the concept of ‘constitutional 
dialogue’ in many cases.29 But although most of the literature on constitutional dialogue brings in courts 
as one of the dialogical partners, the term can (and does) take on a broader meaning. Dialogue not only 
takes place between lawmakers and addressees, but also across different types of decision makers, such 
as legislators, judges, regulators and across traditional constitutional branch divisions. In this section 
we take the various institutional settings in which the concept of constitutional dialogue is employed 
– listing the dialogic partners – as a hinge to connect practical applications of ‘dialogue’ to theoretical 
accounts of the phenomenon. We briefly introduce these accounts below, distinguishing between 
a) more comprehensive, institutionalist constitutional dialogue theories, b) theories that use the concept 
of dialogue more subtly and c) theories that do not use the concept per se but deserve to be mentioned 
because of similar premises (Section 3.2.1). We proceed by illustrating the findings and premises of these 
theories for the following combinations of actors: courts and legislatures (Section 3.2.2); courts and courts 
(Section 3.2.3); courts and citizens (Section 3.2.4); and non-judicial actors and citizens (Section 3.2.5).
3.2.1. A brief overview of theories
The largest category of theories that use the concept of ‘constitutional dialogue’ can be labelled 
‘institutionalist theories’. They have in common that they ‘focus on the institutional process through 
which decisions about constitutional meaning are made’30 rather than on the interpretive criteria and 
techniques that judges use or should use. Institutionalists do not necessarily disregard context but place 
a strong focus on the role of institutions. In most of these theories where constitutional development is at 
issue, the improvement of the process of constitutional norm formation somehow takes place through a 
form of interaction between courts, on the one hand, and a variety of other actors on the other. 
The most systematic overview of institutionalist constitutional dialogue theories to date has 
been presented by Bateup.31 She distinguishes coordinate construction theories, theories of judicial 
principle, equilibrium theories, and partnership theories. Coordinate construction theories present 
the oldest conception of constitutional interpretation as a shared enterprise between the courts and the 
political branches of government, as first espoused by James Madison, later by Thomas Jefferson.32 The 
assumption which is common to the theories under this heading is that each branch of government must 
co-ordinate with the others, yet remain independent, and that each branch has primary responsibility for 
interpreting the Constitution as it concerns its own functions. Theories of judicial principle, on the other 
hand, tend to propose that judges perform a unique dialogic function based on their special institutional 
competence in relation to matters of principle. Equilibrium theories focus on the judiciary’s capacity 
to facilitate society-wide constitutional debate.33 The final category of institutionalist theories which is 
relevant to the concept of ‘dialogue’ goes under the heading of partnership theories which tend to go 
the furthest in terms of updating our views on constitutional structures. These theories draw attention 
to more distinct judicial and legislative functions performed by different branches of government. They 
recognize that each branch of government learns from the specific dialogic inputs of the other branches 
in an institutionally diverse constitutional order. Judicial and non-judicial actors are thus conceived as 
27	 See	Dor,	supra	note	8,	p.	1.
28	 A.	Bickel,	The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 1962.
29	 See	Dor,	supra	note	8,	p.	1.	See	P.W.	Hogg	&	A.A.	Bushell,	‘The	Charter	dialogue	between	courts	and	legislatures’,	1997	Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal	25,	pp.	75-124;	P.W.	Hogg	&	A.A.	Thornton,	‘Reply	to	“Six	Degrees	of	Dialogue”’,	1999	Osgoode Hall Law Journal 37,	pp.	529-536.	




32	 On	Madison’s	position,	see	R.A.	Burt,	The Constitution in Conflict,	1992,	Chapter	2.	On	Jefferson’s	position	see	L.	Fisher,	Constitutional 
Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process,	1988,	p.	238.	References	derived	from	Bateup,	supra	note	2.
33	 See	Bateup,	supra	note	2,	p.	1112.
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equal participants in constitutional decision-making, both of whom dialogically contribute to the search 
for better answers as a result of their unique institutional perspectives.34
As the first of the category of theories which are not necessarily theories of constitutional dialogue, 
but theories that are somehow relevant to the concept, ‘contextualist’ constitutional law theories come to 
mind. Compared to the ‘institutionalist’ theories set out above, ‘contextualist theories’ employ the concept 
of ‘dialogue’ in a much looser fashion. Best known as a normative theory of constitutional interpretation 
and as such as an alternative to ‘originalism’, ‘contextualism’ can also represent an explanatory approach 
to constitutional analysis. Befitting their basic idea that ‘context matters’ (cf. ‘institutions matter’ for 
institutionalism), for contextualists creating and interpreting constitutions is necessarily a ‘dialogue’ in 
an empirical sense, since the shaping of constitutional law always occurs through human interaction in 
a social, political and historical context.35 Constitutional dialogue becomes the obvious, even natural, 
way in which constitutional norms are shaped and interpreted. Furthermore, studies on constitution-
writing have also embraced the concept of ‘constitutional dialogue’ and attempted to use it as a normative 
theoretical device. Sidel, for instance, uses it as an alternative to ‘constitutional instrumentalism’, which in 
his view has dominated the scholarly understanding of socialist constitutions.36 
Finally, as mentioned, there are theories that do not use the concept of ‘dialogue’ as such, but deserve 
mentioning here, because of a similarity in purpose or starting points. Two such recently popular theories 
of public decision-making are new governance theory and regulation theory. As Gerards has remarked, 
constitutional dialogue theory and new governance theory can point in the same direction in the sense 
that both seek solutions for the limits of parliamentary scrutiny in contemporary legal orders.37 Insights 
from regulation theory, on the other hand, can serve as being complimentary to concepts related to 
‘constitutional dialogue’, especially since both seek to get to grips with the increasing heterarchy in the 
fundamental structures of institutionalized public power. 
3.2.2. Courts and legislatures (and governments)
The core of constitutional dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature is that they engage in a 
conversation about constitutional meaning, in which both actors (should) listen in order to learn from 
each other’s perspectives, which can then lead to modifying their own views accordingly. By ‘institutional 
dialogue’38 is meant that ‘courts and legislatures participate in a dialogue aimed at achieving the 
proper balance between constitutional principles and public policies and the existence of this dialogue 
constitutes a good reason for not conceiving of judicial review as democratically illegitimate’39 and 
applies ‘anywhere legislatures are able to reverse, modify, avoid, or otherwise reply to judicial decisions 
nullifying legislation’.40 In this way, ‘dialogue’ represents the ‘middle way between judicial supremacy 
on the one hand, and legislative supremacy on the other’.41 As the legislature, helped by institutional 
mechanisms such as ‘declarations of incompatibility’, has the possibility to modify judicial decisions 
regarding constitutional matters, the sharp edges are being removed from the ‘counter-majoritarian 
dilemma’.
The most prominent example of ‘constitutional dialogue’ is related to the Canadian Charter, where 
the Constitution itself features the possibility of dialogue between the legislator and the high court.42 
This very specific branch of dialogue theory ‘has taken on a life of its own and become the predominant 
theoretical approach to the Charter’.43 According to Gardbaum, ‘[i]t has since spread to the U.K. and 
34	 A	clear	example	of	this	type	of	theory	is	the	work	of	Janet	Hiebert,	see	her	Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament’s Role?,	2002.
35	 See	Kloppenberg,	supra	note	14.
36	 See	Sidel,	supra	note	14.







also,	R.F.	Devlin,	‘The	Charter	and	Anglophone	Legal	Theory’,	1997	Review of Constitutional Studies	4,	no.	1,	p.	31,	stating	that	‘about	this	
apparent	faith	in	dialogism	(…)	at	this	point	I	simply	want	to	highlight	that	almost	everyone	seems	to	be	doing	it’.
43	 S.	Gardbaum,	‘Reassessing	the	New	Commonwealth	Model	of	Constitutionalism’,	2010	International Journal of Constitutional Law	8,	pp.	167-206.	
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Australia, where the new model as a whole is often referred to as “the dialogue model” and/or is justified 
on the basis that it promotes “democratic dialogue”’.44 The claim that ‘both courts and legislatures share 
responsibility for making judgments about constitutional values and for assessing the reasonableness 
of their own actions in light of those values’45 can be applied and is being applied beyond the Canadian 
context, though.46 
While courts and legislatures share responsibility for respecting constitutional values, each has a 
distinct relationship to a constitutional conflict. This is not only because they are differently situated, but 
also because they each bring distinct and valuable perspectives to constitutional judgment given their 
different institutional characteristics and responsibilities.47 All varieties of institutionalist constitutional 
dialogue theories assume that interpreting and defining rights is at the core of judicial decision-making. 
However, they differ as to whether this task should be reinforced by the dialogue or rather shared 
with the legislature. However, most institutionalist constitutional dialogue theories ‘suggest (…) that 
judicial review will need to be weakened, compared to traditional models, before it can be counted fully 
legitimate’.48
Coordinate construction theories and theories of judicial principle are the most traditional in this 
sense. The former claim that courts and legislatures enter into the dialogue from their own distinct 
positions.49 Theories of judicial principle are more court-focused, placing the dialogic qualities mainly 
on the side of the judiciary.50 Both theories accommodate two different perspectives on the source and 
function of the dialogue. The first, ‘reactive’, perspective suggests that dialogue is generated as a result 
of the political branches checking principled court interpretations in the event of judicial error.51 The 
other perspective, that can be characterized as geared towards ‘prevention’, focuses on how dialogue 
emerges through the legislative articulation of policy objectives when the legislature responds to 
judicial decisions.52 Partnership theories subscribe to the latter perspective, hypothesizing that dialogue 
often begins with legislators when they initially consider whether legislation is consistent with written 
constitutional norms.53 It then continues in individual cases, where the deliberations of the legislature 
are conveyed through legal argument and where the deliberations of the court are revealed through its 
judgments. The dialogue subsequently returns to the legislature, which considers if and how to respond 
to the court’s decision.54 One starting point of partnership theories, and one in which they differ from 
coordinate construction theories and theories of judicial principle, is that they do not presume that 




47	 J.	 Hiebert,	 ‘Parliament	 and	 the	 Human	 Rights	 Act:	 can	 the	 JCHR	 help	 facilitate	 a	 culture	 of	 rights?’,	 2006	 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 4,	no.	1,	pp.	1-38.
48	 R.	Dixon,	‘Creating	Dialogue	about	Socioeconomic	Rights:	Strong-form	versus	Weak-form	Judicial	Review	Revisited’,	2007	International 
Journal of Constitutional Law	5,	no.	3,	pp.	391-393.
49	 For	the	employment	of	this	theory	in	this	institutional	setting	see	L.	Fisher,	Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process, 
1988;	N.	Devins	&	L.	Fisher,	‘Judicial	Exclusivity	and	Political	Instability’,	1998	Virgina Law Review	84,	p.	83;	K.	Whittington,	Constitutional 
Construction,	 1999;	W.F.	Murphy,	 ‘Who	 Shall	 Interpret?	 The	Quest	 for	 the	Ultimate	 Constitutional	 Interpreter’,	 1986	The Review of 
Politics,	48,	no.	3,	pp.	401-423;	M.S.	Paulsen,	‘The	Most	Dangerous	Branch:	Executive	Power	to	Say	what	the	Law	Is’,	1994	Georgia Law 
Journal	83,	pp.	217-345.
50	 For	the	employment	of	this	theory	 in	this	 institutional	setting	see	Bickel,	supra	note	28;	M.J.	Perry,	The Constitution, The Courts and 
Human Rights,	1982;	M.J.	Perry,	The Constitution in the Courts,	1994;	J.	Agresto,	The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy,	1984;	




Journal of Constitutional Law	23,	pp.	127-138;	Hogg	&	Bushell,	supra	note	29;	Hogg	et	al.,	supra	note	3;	Roach,	supra	note	1;	Roach,	supra	
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There are also looser varieties of these theories, in which constitutional dialogue morphs into a 
more general theory of checks and balances between the judiciary and the legislator. Here ‘allowing for 
a legislative response to judicial decisions’56 is considered sufficient to constitute ‘dialogue’. In a sense all 
constitutional review of legislation can be seen as a form of dialogue. The very fact that judicial decisions 
are open to reversal, modification, or even avoidance by the competent legislative body necessarily triggers 
a ‘dialogue’, even if it remains implicit. As a more explicit example we may think of the ‘declaration of 
incompatibility’ that can be issued by judges in the United Kingdom if they consider that the terms of a 
statute are incompatible with the UK’s obligations under the Human Rights Act, which incorporated the 
European Convention on Human Rights into UK domestic law. 
This brings us to a core point in theoretical accounts of court-legislature relationships (sometimes 
explicitly including ‘governments’ as well, see Table 1 below): the ‘weakening’ of judicial review often 
turns into a changing of its nature instead and often a tacit strengthening eventually. As the key actors 
in ‘institutional dialogue’, judicial actors have a broad responsibility to ‘play an active role in countering 
“blind spots” and “burdens of inertia” in the political process’.57 As Witteveen has pointed out, in the Dutch 
discussion about introducing a constitutional review of statutory legislation,58 the fear of conceding these 
points is unfortunately predominant.59
3.2.3. Courts and courts
In other publications the legislature does not necessarily take part in the dialogue. Here, the metaphor 
is either reserved for cooperation between constitutional or the highest courts or is applied to different 
levels within the judiciary. There is a burgeoning body of literature on judicial dialogues, which has 
already fleshed out the concept of dialogue quite a bit, but which is still struggling with the implications 
of its findings on public decision-making more widely speaking. Also, the literature on intra-judicial 
dialogue has a less distinct theoretical underpinning than the previous actor pair.
Rosas has distinguished five categories of ‘judicial dialogue’, distinguishing the basis of the 
relationship between the courts involved (hierarchical-heterarchical and horizontal-vertical).60 The first 
category encompasses dialogues between courts belonging to the same national system, where they are 
part of a vertical, hierarchical system. The second category is reserved for the special relationship which 
exists between the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the national courts of the Member 
States, which is hierarchical but includes the special dialogical mechanism of the preliminary reference 
procedure. As a third category Rosas proposes ‘the “semi-vertical” relation which exists, for instance, 
between the CJEU and the Strasbourg Court (the ECtHR)’.61 His fourth category contains dialogues 
between courts with overlapping or ‘competing’ jurisdictions. The final category is that of horizontal 
judicial dialogues, which take place between ‘courts which are more or less at the same level’.62 Obviously 
the boundaries between the latter two categories become easily blurred. This is illustrated by the 
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of interaction between courts and semi-judicial institutions whose role is still unclear, such as the new 
human rights institute.63
Claes and De Visser have observed that many traditional venues of alleged ‘judicial dialogue’ 
(‘[t]he preliminary reference procedure and case law, the formal and official channels of communication 
available to courts’64), are less promising in terms of dialogical quality than informal channels of intra-
judicial influencing: ‘[e]xtrajudicial exchanges, both in writing and via personal contacts, score much 
higher as they allow for a free exchange of ideas and arguments on a more equal footing and even give 
room for deliberation on common issues’.65 Indeed, we observe a shift in focus among publications on 
judicial dialogues towards less institutionalized horizontal networks of judges. According to Rosenfeld, 
‘of special importance in this respect are the international networks among judges working in national, 
transnational, and international judicial bodies and dealing with issues that are constitutional in nature 
either from a formal or a functional standpoint. This trend has fostered a real “dialogue among judges”’.66 
Furthermore, the special way of composing constitutional courts – especially the fact that they host 
so many law professors – has also been pinpointed as ‘an additional and important channel in the 
transmission of progressive attitudes from the academia to the judiciary’.67
As a side note, we would also like to refer to the application of team theory on the judiciary.68 The 
main aim of adjudication according to this theoretical approach is to decide as many cases as ‘correctly’ 
as possible. Although the main point of analyses based on team theory is to see whether notable 
features of the judiciary emerge endogenously in such a setting, as a logical consequence of the effort 
by the ‘judicial team’ to organize itself effectively, it can also shed some light on the phenomenon of 
lower court deviation from its superiors. In this model, even though the judiciary has no substantive 
reason to promote certainty or uniformity, these qualities will emerge as collateral consequences of the 
organizational aim of getting the decisions right as a team. We see possibilities for extending partnership 
theory, which traditionally always includes the legislature as one of the dialogic partners, to the judiciary 
by connecting to team theory, which, so far, has not tended to use the concept of ‘dialogue’ explicitly.
3.2.4. Courts and citizens
Commonly, concerns regarding the countermajoritarian dilemma lying behind this willingness to break the 
traditional monopoly of the courts (and legislatures) were deemed to have preference over constitutional 
interpretation and to give up hierarchical mechanisms in favour of heterarchical ones. However, within 
the institutionalist tradition efforts were made to include ‘the people’ in dialogues involving the judiciary. 
Equilibrium theories focus on the judiciary’s capacity to facilitate society-wide constitutional debate.69 
According to Bateup these theories provide a much more promising account of constitutional dialogue 
than the coordinate construction theories and theories of judicial principle. The central assumption here 
is that if a (highest) court strays too far from what the other branches of government and the people 
accept its announcements, political constraints such as the power of judicial appointments and popular 
backlash will bring this court back into line. In the Dutch context this concern has been voiced by the 
63	 P.B.C.D.F.	van	Sasse	van	Ysselt,	‘College	voor	de	rechten	van	de	mens	en	constitutionele	toetsing’,	2012	RegelMaat	27,	no.	4,	pp.	225-239:	
‘[T]he	Council	of	State	will	have	to	ponder	its	relationship	with	the	[newly	established]	Netherlands	Institute	for	Human	Rights.	It	would	





66	 A.M.	Slaughter,	‘A	Typology	of	Transjudicial	Communication’,	1994	University of Richmond Law Review	29,	p.	29.	For	more	literature	on	
this	particular	European	 judicial	dialogue,	see	L.	Scheeck,	 ‘Competition,	Conflict	and	Cooperation	between	European	Courts	and	the	
Diplomacy	of	Supranational	Judicial	Networks’,	2007	GARNET Working Paper.
67	 C.	Guarnieri,	‘Courts	and	Marginalized	Groups:	Perspectives	from	Continental	Europe’,	2007	International Journal of Constitutional Law 
38,	p.	187.
68	 See	A.F.	Daughety	&	J.F.	Reinganum,	‘Appealing	Judgments.’	2000	RAND Journal of Economics	31,	pp.	502-525;	M.C.	Dorf,	‘Prediction	and	
the	Rule	of	Law’	1995	UCLA Law Review	42,	pp.	651-715;	L.A.	Kornhauser,	‘An	Economic	“Perspective	on	Stare	Decisis”’,	1989	Fordham 
Law Review	65,	pp.	63-92;	L.A.	Kornhauser,	 ‘Adjudication	by	a	Resource-Constrained	Team’,	1995	Southern California Law Review	68,	
pp.	1605-1629;	J.	Rogers,	‘Lower	Court	Application	of	the	‘Overruling	Law’	of	Higher	Courts’,	1995 Legal Theory 1,	pp.	179-204;	S.	Shavell,	
‘The	Appeals	Process	as	a	Means	of	Error	Correction’,	1995	Journal of Legal Studies	23,	pp.	379-426.
69	 See	B.	Friedman,	 ‘Dialogue	and	Judicial	Review’,	1993	Michigan Law Review	91,	pp.	577-682;	Friedman,	supra	note	18;	B.	Friedman,	
‘Mediated	Popular	Constitutionalism’,	2003	Michigan Law Review	101,	pp.	2596–	2636;	Bateup,	supra	note	2.
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National Ombudsman, when he predicted that the further the traditional constitutional branches merge 
into a unitas politica, the greater the societal counter-forces that will emerge as an extra-constitutional 
form of checks and balances.70 More establishment-minded is the focus on the ‘partnership’ that judges 
and legal scholars can form. Judges are seen as the ‘key audience of scholarly work’ aimed at ‘offering 
up prescription to courts and deploying techniques that are capable of ready reception by courts’71 with 
status-enhancing effects for both parties.  
Beyond institutionalist theories, new governance theories further refine the general call for openness 
that is part of constitutional dialogue, by developing criteria and mechanisms revolving around the duty 
to give reasons and transparency. These directly or indirectly help courts to connect with citizens in a 
dynamic and reciprocal manner. Governance criteria can be incorporated into judgments, which in turn 
may provide an ‘incentive structure for participation, transparency, principled decision-making, and 
accountability’.72 The various ‘dialogic’ ways in which citizens and stakeholders can engage with public 
decision-making that are being experimented with, need to have implications for judicial decision-
making as well. More direct forms of participation, such as public consultation and citizens’ initiatives, 
are being introduced, requiring not only new institutional norms, but also different judicial responses. 
Friedman emphasizes the role of public opinion as a major force to ‘demand that the court responds to 
changing popular interpretations of constitutional issues’.73 Popular opinion can reach courts in several 
ways: through individuals who bring lawsuits to test the bounds of a constitutional decision, by scholarly 
articles, by formal or informal lobbying by interest groups, by media attention et cetera. He notes that the 
court plays an important role in this system of dialogue by serving as the facilitator of a broader national 
discussion about constitutional meaning. The question as Friedman phrases it is ‘to what extent popular 
debate and the ensuing political pressure will lead to the production of stable and broadly supported views 
on constitutional issues?’74 In the Netherlands, Vranken has championed the potential for ‘constitutional 
dialogue’ in the sense of the deference of the Supreme Court towards ‘civil society’ in the sense that the 
court can more actively and explicitly recognize and help shape self-regulation.75 
3.2.5. Non-judicial actors and citizens
Vranken has also predicted an ever wider scope of the term ‘constitutional dialogue’, even in practice 
and mainstream legal scholarship, so as to include – besides the judiciary and the legislature – societal 
groups, NGOs, administrative authorities and regulators as well as the networks which link these actors, 
either formally or informally.76 The view that public discourse eventually helps to form a stable view 
of constitutional meanings to which courts ultimately adapt their opinions has been further extended 
to encompass constitutional activities other than ‘interpretation’ and therefore non-judicial actors. 
Ackerman, for instance, speaks of ‘legitimization through a deepening institutional dialogue between 
political elites and ordinary citizens.’77 Bakker stipulates that there are institutional mechanisms beyond 
law, which implicate constitutional dialogue, either by contributing to the ‘stable influencing’ or instead by 
harming the public discourse and decreasing the possibility of widespread and stable views on important 
constitutional matters.78 Bakker’s main argument is that we need more insights into how to adapt or 
70	 A.	 Brenninkmeijer,	 ‘Unitas	 Politica’,	 2012	Nederlands Juristenblad,	 no.	 3,	 pp.	 192-193;	 R.C.	 Post,	 ‘Fashioning	 the	 Legal	 Constitution:	
Culture,	Courts,	and	Law’,	2003	Harvard Law Review	117,	pp.	4-112;	R.C.	Post	&	R.B.	Siegel,	‘Legislative	Constitutionalism	and	Section	
Five	Power:	Polycentric	Interpretation	of	the	Family	and	Medical	Leave	Act’,	2003	Yale Law Journal 112,	no.	8,	pp.	1943-2060;	Bakker,	
supra	note	3.
71	 S.	Bartie,	‘The	lingering	core	of	legal	scholarship’,	2010	Legal Studies 30,	no.	3,	pp.	345-369.
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design ‘systems of constitutional dialogue in a way which recognizes the central place of the people in 
ongoing discussion about fundamental values’.79 The trouble with existing studies regarding participation 
by ‘the people’ in societal dialogues is that they do not give us pointers about ‘what works’. Assuming that 
‘the normative desirability of connecting debate and discussion about constitutional values to broader 
society is clear,’80 we need research on what exact mechanisms work under what conditions at a level 
where detail matters. 
One promising line of research in this regard is the aforementioned anti-instrumentalist application 
of constitutional dialogue. The instrumentalist theory holds that constitutions in Communist Party-
run socialist countries ‘have been, and remain, a means of political control by a single party, a way of 
expressing Communist Party political, economic and social policy in constitutional terms, a method for 
mobilizing action, and a malleable document subject to redrafting and adoption by a compliant legislature 
as times and policy changed’.81 Sidel argues that this approach, which remains the lens through which 
most foreign understanding of socialist constitutional processes are understood, is no longer adequate 
for modern socialist states, and argues therefore that an approach of constitutional dialogue should be 
taken. Sidel refers to constitutional dialogue as a transitional constitutional dialogue and debate, which 
is utilized with great effectiveness by multiple, overlapping, often conflicting forces within these states to 
achieve their purposes.82 
Another venue for further research uses regulation theory to supplement the efforts by constitutional 
dialogue theories to deal with the dispersion of activities such as constitutional interpretation. As we 
have seen, constitutional dialogue theory has made some steps towards widening the range of actors as 
constitutional actors or analyzing traditional actors in new roles.83 Regulation theory adds to this the 
possibility that these actors employ instruments beyond the law to influence constitutional practice. The 
integration of insights from behavioural sciences is a key element here. Regardless of whether formal or 
informal mechanisms are the object of investigation, insights from regulation theory can help hypothesize 
regarding the effects of specific instruments within those mechanisms (e.g. peer review within networks 
or transnational codes of conducts).84 Although concepts such as ‘conversation’,85 ‘negotiation’86 and 
‘conflict’87 have been explored in the regulation literature, the ‘dialogue’ lens may provide a useful new 
perspective as it may accommodate an easier way of making the connection between regulatory practices 
and constitutional values.
Finally, there are uses of the concept in the literature where ‘dialogue’, although aimed at an ‘ever 
better constitutional interpretation’, is not taking place between ‘actors’ but between legal fields, e.g. 
between international law and constitutional law.88 Another option along those lines is ‘a jurisprudential 
dialogue between European and Islamic legal orders, where the individual tenets of one system are tested 
against those of the other.’89 Also, in the field of legal education ‘dialogue’ is being used as a didactic tool 
for helping students to develop a less static (and more contextualist) understanding of constitutional 
law.90
Our findings are reflected in the table below. The table provides an overview of the (strands of) 
literature employing different theoretical approaches in various institutional settings. Although inevitably 
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4 Constitutional dialogue: caveats
As has been shown above, the concept of constitutional dialogue is being used in a multiplicity of 
ways. Among these there have also been critical side notes. Some authors have even reserved specific 
qualifications for a constitutional dialogue that is not fully reaching its potential and perhaps even 
having detrimental effects. For instance, Dor distinguishes between ‘proper’ dialogues – which he calls 
‘substantive’ – and ‘improper’ dialogues – we do not adopt his qualification of ‘formal’ here, because 
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that term is often reserved for ‘official’ dialogic mechanisms. The former are those ‘in which the parties 
participating are themselves committed to and engaged in a search for a harmonious solution that will 
contain both the Court’s interpretation of a constitutional question and the legislature’s interest’.91 In the 
latter type of dialogue actors do not really engage with the other’s objections, resulting in a situation where 
‘the final formal act is that of the legislature, but the final words are those of the Court’.92 Other criticisms 
of ‘constitutional dialogue’ include the observation that the concept ‘contradicts the assumption that 
judicial decisions are final’.93 Of course, this criticism is only applicable to the conception of constitutional 
dialogue that focuses on a dialogue between courts and other actors. Besides, it seems questionable 
whether the criticism is valid, as judicial decisions may need to have ‘finality’ in concrete cases, but their 
legal consequences can often be separated from their role in the development of constitutional law more 
broadly speaking. 
A further caveat is not necessarily related to the concept of ‘constitutional dialogue’ as such, but 
rather to the immature state of the research on the issue. A risk of the eclectic use of the term is that 
legal scholarship has no tools to debunk solutions that are presented as ‘dialogical’, but is only using the 
popularity of the concept to cover up misuses of power or inequalities in what essentially are hierarchical 
relationships. Claes and De Visser have pointed out that many classifications of prototypes of ‘dialogues’ 
can be slightly misleading since they are necessarily incomplete and often seem ‘to presuppose a certain 
positive quality to all dialogue and thereby disregard interactions that are unpleasant or downright 
antagonistic’.94 Indeed, there is a constant risk when using ‘dialogue’ in law that dialogical possibilities 
will open up, only to be hijacked by actions that are far from dialogical in nature.95 Some have pointed to 
the ‘high level of monologue’ that even some scholarly analysis using the notion of ‘dialogue’ contains.96 
The lack of theoretical clarity regarding the concept of ‘constitutional dialogue’ is a problem, because 
empirical analyses and normative accounts easily become mixed up in the realm of constitutional law. 
One solution is to start out by using ‘constitutional dialogue’ empirically to ‘describe the increasingly 
interactive process that is taking place in the area of constitutional development between the legislature 
and judiciary and between national, European and international actors amongst themselves, as well as 
between actors within the rule of law and those outside’.97 The step to positioning ‘dialogue’ up there 
with normative concepts such as ‘checks and balances’ is often temptingly small, though. Indeed, since 
‘constitutional dialogue’ is often embraced as a solution in practice, the risk of ‘tunnel vision’ and 
‘confirmation bias’ go beyond academic interest. This is especially the case in systems – such as the Dutch 
one – without a constitutional court to authoritatively distinguish between constitutional practice and 
constitutional law. If institutional relations are not justiciable, it will harder to discern whether dialogic 
features of the interaction are merely a part of an empirical reality or a part of ‘how things should be’ 
according to constitutional doctrine. Also, a strict separation between empirical analysis involving 
constitutional dialogue and normative uses has its own drawbacks. Bateup, considering various versions 
of theories in which the concept of judicial dialogue is central, points out that normative theories are 
often problematic in that they overvalue the role of courts in constitutional decision-making, and that 
explanatory or descriptive theories that use constitutional dialogue as an empirical concept ‘fail to offer 
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5. Broader implications and practical guidelines
That leaves us with the question of how to overcome these caveats in the practice of legal research. In this 
section, we provide three guidelines for legal scholars who consider using the concept of constitutional 
dialogue in their research. First, the concept of constitutional dialogue is applicable beyond dialogue 
as mere metaphor. It can be utilized as a lens or method, resulting in different types of research and 
research outcomes. Researchers should be careful when it comes to mixing these diverging approaches 
(Section 5.1). Second, and somewhat related, the concept of constitutional dialogue can contribute to 
both empirical and normative analyses of a constitutional system, as long as these types of analyses are 
not simultaneously the main goal of the research project. We propose to consider – regardless of the 
nature of the main type of analysis – the nature of the interaction between the two (Section 5.2). 
5.1. Choosing between a lens and a method
In a good share of the publications we analyzed, the term ‘dialogue’ is employed as a metaphor. Although 
the power of the metaphor itself is not to be discarded, the possibilities of this concept move – as proved 
by several authors – beyond its use as a mere metaphor. We have distinguished at least two additional 
possibilities: using the concept as a lens or as a method. It is clear that it is tempting for legal scholars 
to use ‘dialogue’ as a lens, on the one hand, and subsequently to recommend it as a method, whilst 
neglecting to stipulate what is behind the metaphor. Before making suggestions as to how to use ‘dialogue’ 
to improve different arenas of public decision-making, we submit that researchers first and foremost 
explicitly choose among these two usages.
As a lens the concept of constitutional dialogue is utilized to review current constitutional 
arrangements (development, interpretation). The usefulness of this lens is nicely illustrated by the 
reminder from Palmer of the ‘vital constitutional need to think about who we want to be engaging in 
constitutional dialogue – who we want to be exercising public power and safeguarding the exercise of 
public power through maintaining the rule of law’.99 This quote implies that the purposeful conception 
of a certain set of constitutionally relevant interactions as ‘dialogue’ makes us reconsider traditional 
assumptions of constitutional roles and task divisions.100 In other words, by taking a dialogical perspective 
with regard to the shaping of the most fundamental normative practices of public decision-making, new 
solutions for constitutional dilemmas may be found. Of course the metaphorical sense of the concept 
is not eliminated within this approach. The stylized research questions presented in Table 2 below are 
intended to show how the concept of constitutional dialogue can be usefully employed not ‘just’ as a 
metaphor, but to describe or explain constitutional arrangements. A prominent example of the use of 
‘dialogue’ as a lens can be found in Chen’s work.101 He uses the concept of inter-branch dialogue to 
describe the constitutional politics and the development of a national plan for an integrated system of 
roads and canals in the United States, by conducting a historical analysis. The lens of ‘dialogue’ allows 
Chen to show how ‘interaction’ played a crucial role in reconciling the views that Congress and several 
presidents were holding regarding the constitutionality of such projects. 
Constitutional dialogue can also be applied as a method. Whereas the metaphor is of some use 
when ‘dialogue’ is used as a lens, constitutional dialogue presented as a method urges us to move beyond 
the metaphorical sense. In this approach, ‘dialogue’ can function as a genuine way of organizing public 
decision-making processes, whether or not imposing a set of ensuing procedural norms. The idea of 
dialogue as a method is therefore ambitious; it comprises the use of the intrinsic properties of ‘dialogue’ 
to structure public decision-making in a certain way and possibly also to formulate the desired ‘rules 
of the game’.102 Our literature review showed that this ‘method’ approach to constitutional dialogue has 
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been far more popular so far than the use as a lens: it was employed – at least in part – by all studied 
publications.
5.2. Choosing between empirical and normative analysis 
In the publications we analyzed, the concept of constitutional dialogue has been used both empirically 
and more normatively. By ‘empirical’ we mean that the concept is being used to describe either the ‘rules 
of the game’ found in constitutional practice and/or the precise actors involved and their contribution to 
constitutional decision-making. Although we did find such empirical accounts, there is relatively little 
empirical analysis dealing with the way in which different public actors interact by using the concept of 
constitutional dialogue. As stated above, the literature on regulatory governance has provided insights 
from related perspectives of conversation, negotiation and conflict, but there seems to be room for the 
concept of dialogue as a useful new perspective in this regard. Although Bateup concludes that explanatory 
theories behind the concept of constitutional dialogues have so far failed to provide a convincing 
account,103 we emphasize the possibility of using dialogue to empirically describe constitutional processes. 
This is closely related to the use of constitutional dialogue as a lens. However, the possibility of using the 
‘lens approach’ for normative analysis should not be discarded either. Constitutional processes can be 
reviewed with the aim of arriving at normative statements about the current mode of constitutional 
development or interpretation (see Table 2 for an abstract example of the type of question that can be 
asked).104 However, before we can safely put forward normative claims as to which actors should be 
involved in what constitutional role, we would do well to invest in a sound understanding of who actually 
participates in the process of constitutional norm formation within a certain context.
Taking the method approach of constitutional dialogue provides a possible vehicle for a normative 
account in looking at dialogue as a solution (see Table 2). Of course, when talking in terms of ‘solutions’ 
the devil is definitely in the detail. This is why the method approach also needs to ask empirical questions 
regarding the effects of dialogic features in public decision-making. For instance, constitutional systems 
that have formally adopted the elements of constitutional dialogue can be investigated to this end. The 
choice between using constitutional dialogue as a lens or as a method and between an empirical and a 
normative approach ultimately depends on the type of question one is interested in (see Table 2).
Table 2 Prototypical research questions with different uses of ‘dialogue’
Empirical Normative
Dialogue as a lens ‘What do we discover about a particular 
category of public decision-making if we see it 
as a dialogue?’
‘Who do we want to be engaging in 
constitutional dialogue in what role?’
Dialogue as a method ‘What dialogic elements/mechanisms/features 
are having what effects?’ 
‘For what problems of public decision-
making and to what extent can ‘dialogue’ 
be a solution?’
6. Conclusion
Posner already stated in 1993 that ‘what is missing from law are penetrating and rigorous theories, 
counterintuitive hypotheses that are falsifiable but not falsified – precise instrumentation, an exact 
vocabulary, a clear separation of positive and normative inquiry, (…), and above all and subsuming most 
of the previous points, objectively testable (…) hypotheses. In law there is the blueprint or shadow of 
scientific reasoning, but no edifice.’105 The different theoretical accounts behind the concept of constitutional 
dialogue as identified in this article provide a possibility to fill this gap in legal constitutional research. 




105	R.A.	Posner,	The Problems of Jurisprudence,	1993,	p.	69,	emphasis	added.
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Although the theoretical accounts are far from being ‘penetrating’ and ‘rigorous’, they provide a step 
forward in theory-oriented legal research. If a legal scholar considers using the concept of constitutional 
dialogue in legal research he can either explicitly align with one of the theoretical accounts portrayed in 
this article or develop an alternative account based on these accounts. 
In this contribution we have attempted to structure the large, diverse and growing literature employing 
the concept of ‘constitutional dialogue’. We have seen that the use of the concept these days extends far 
beyond ‘dialogues between courts and legislatures’ and ‘judicial dialogues’, which do remain the two 
best known applications. Rather than reconstructing a ‘constitutional dialogue theory’ we have explored 
various theoretical bases for the concepts and tracked how these relate to actor-types (Table 1). Whereas 
theories encompassing the concept of ‘dialogue’ used to limit themselves to the new openness among 
actors within the now classic constitutional duas politica of courts and legislatures, newer applications 
explicitly search for ways of engaging the citizen. Furthermore, legal academics are not just looking at a 
way to empower citizens in constitutional interpretation, but also when it comes to other constitutional 
activities, most notably constitution-writing.
Finally, we have listed some caveats for legal practice and scholarship in employing ‘constitutional 
dialogue’. The way forward, we suggest, lies in distinguishing clearly between the use of ‘constitutional 
dialogue’ as a ‘lens’, on the one hand, and as ‘method’ on the other. Within both uses there is scope 
and a need for both empirical and normative analysis, only in different ways (see Table 2). When using 
‘dialogue’ as a lens, the challenge is to move from an empirical account of certain constitutional dynamics 
to a reconsideration of normative questions regarding divisions of power. For ‘constitutional dialogue’ 
as method – the most interesting and most underdeveloped use at the same time – the main challenge is 
gathering insights into the variables that determine if and how dialogic mechanisms work.
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Annex 1
For analyzing the selected sources, we used the following framework of analysis. We first considered 
the conceptualization of constitutional dialogue employed within the existing literature. Second, we 
considered the participants in the dialogue. In what institutional setting did the author employ the concept 
of constitutional dialogue? Who participated? Lastly, we considered the theoretical underpinnings of the 
approach taken in the studied literature. 
1. Conceptualization of constitutional dialogue in the article
a.  Definition of dialogue:
 a.  Can a definition/description of dialogue be found in the article?
 b.  If yes, what is the definition?
 c.   Does the definition (or the author’s implicit understanding of ‘dialogue’) refer to a pattern between 
actors in the dialogue?
 d.  Does the definition (or the author’s implicit understanding of ‘dialogue’) refer to equality/absence 
of power relations?
 e.   Does the definition (or the author’s implicit understanding of ‘dialogue’) refer to some kind of 
mutual interaction?
 f.  Does it refer to other aspects?
b. Synonyms for dialogue
 a.  What other concepts are used for dialogue in the article?
c. Definition of constitution
 a.  Is a definition/description of constitution given in the article?
 b.  If yes, what is the definition?
 c.  Does the definition refer to stability?
 d. Does the definition refer to codification elements?
 e.  Does the definition refer to highest norms?
 f.  Not explicitly addressing constitutional dialogue
d. What constitutional activity or process is described in the article? (choose)
 i.  Constitutional interpretation
 ii. Constitutional review
 iii. Constitution-making
 iv. Constitutional change
 v.  Other (please specify)
e. What is the function of dialogue? (choose)




 v.  Limiting
 vi. Other (please specify)
f. Dialogue as a method, lens or metaphor?
 a.  Does the article refer to an instrumental function of dialogue (method) 
 b.  Is the concept of dialogue used to structure public decision-making (method)
 c.  Is the word metaphor explicitly used in relation to dialogue? 
 d. Is dialogue used to describe a certain relationship between actors (lens)
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2. Participants within the dialogue
g. Participants
 a.  Who are the participants in the dialogue? (choose two or more)
    i. Constituent authority
    ii. Courts (indicate level)
    iii. Legislature
    iv.  Government
    v. Regulatory agencies
    vi. Institutions of Constraint (Ombudsman, etc.)
    vii. Non-governmental organizations
    viii. Social partners
    ix. Citizens/public
3. Positioning in theory
h. Type of contribution (choose)




 v.  (A-theoretical)
i. Reference to constitutional dialogue theory
 a.  Does the article make an implicit or explicit reference to CDT?
 b.  If implicit or explicit, what does it say about it?
j. Mainstream versus non-mainstream
k. References (embedment in existing knowledge)
 a.  To which authors does the article refer more than once?
l. Theoretical approaches
 a.  Does the author mention a theoretical approach taken?
 b.  If yes, how does the author describe this approach?
 c.  Does the theoretical approach fit  into one of the following categories?
    i. Deliberative theory/Communication theory
    ii. Coordinate construction theories
    iii. Theories of judicial principle
    iv. Equilibrium theories
    v. Partnership theories/team theories
    vi. Other (please specify)
 d. Does the author mention other theoretical approaches than his or her own?
 e.  If so, what does the author say about these approaches?
